

Summary of the argument for mental monism

Peter B Lloyd, October 2010

1. The mental world is the totality of facts in all conscious minds, human or otherwise.
 - 1.1 All mental terms are defined by private ostensive definition.
 - 1.1.1 For example, the word "red" used to denote the conscious colour experience of red, as opposed to red light or red paint, is defined by attending to a red sensation and designating it "red".
 - 1.2 All physical terms are defined analytically in terms of undefined fundamentals.
 - 1.2.1 For example, "electron" denotes something having a certain rest mass and electrical charge.
 - 1.3 The privacy of mental terms' definition precludes their having logical relation to physical terms.
 - 1.3.1 The mental facts that constitute the referant of a mental term are not exposed to inspection by third-person instruments and therefore cannot be denominated by any physical term.
 - 1.4 Therefore mental terms and physical terms form disjoint sets.
 - 1.5 Propositions expressed in physical terms can entail only other propositions expressed in physical terms.
 - 1.6 Therefore mental propositions and physical propositions form disjoint sets.
 - 1.7 Therefore mental facts can never be deduced from physical facts.
 - 1.8 Therefore mental facts are ontologically self-subsistent and not supervenient on, or reducible to, physical facts.
 - 1.8.1 In other words, physical monism is necessarily false.
2. Mental propositions refer to the conscious mind.
 - 2.1 By their ostensive definition, mental terms have an extra-linguistic reference.
 - 2.1.1 For example, the term "red" refers outside the language to the actual sensation of red.

- 2.2 By their analytical definition in terms of undefined primitives, physical terms are incapable of bearing any extra-linguistic reference.
 - 2.2.1 Physics discourse is, in itself, a closed linguistic system.
 - 2.2.2 In the terminology used by John Foster, physics is topic-neutral: it defines logical and structural relations but has no means to denote intrinsic qualities and hence has no means to establish an extra-linguistic reference.
- 2.3 Since the natural world proceeds in an orthonomic manner independently of our personal wills, there must be some agency at work in the universe over and above personal minds.
- 2.4 The discourse of physics is capable only of articulating orthonomic causal relations within the closed language-game of physics.
- 2.5 Therefore, physics is unable to bear any reference to an actual agency that is responsible for the observed regular behaviour of the natural world.
- 2.6 Therefore, the only articulable notion of an agent is that of a conscious volitional mind.
- 2.7 So the agency that is responsible for driving the natural world is a conscious mind.
 - 2.7.1 Berkeley called that mind 'God'; the Vedanta calls it 'Brahman'; in my books, I have called it 'the metaimind'.
3. The world is a dream in God's mind.